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Abstract 
Current tactical models of Supply Chains (SC) associate the conflicts among independent SCs 
with the uncertain behaviour of external echelons (third parties). Although the trend now arises 
to solve these conflicts using multi-objective optimization and game theory, typical analytical 
models do not consider the benefits of uncertainty reduction obtained when a supply/demand 
contract is agreed, which can be modelled as the probability of acceptance of solutions with 
reduced benefits, where lies precisely the novelty of this work. Accordingly, this work proposes 
a win-win scenario-based negotiation approach, for the case of decentralized multi-site and 
multi-product SCs in a highly competitive environment. Different price scenarios, offered by the 
leader SC, are analyzed for the negotiation item, resulting in different MINLP tactical models, 
which are illustrated using a case study that coordinates different suppliers’ SCs with an 
industrial production/distribution SC in a global scenario. The negotiation scenario resulting 
from maximizing each SC profit proves to be the most adequate, leading to higher global profits. 
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Background 
The competitiveness among chemical industries shifts the interest of Process Systems Engineering (PSE) 
towards SCs coordination based on individual and global benefits. Many works have been carried out to 
highlight the coordination among several SCs, such as the integration of different SCM levels in which an 
enterprise-wide cross-functional coordination model is proposed by integrating both strategic and tactical 
levels [1]; or the coordination of suppliers and production SCs at the tactical level using different pricing 
models for centralized SCs [2]. But, these works support decisions based on the objectives of one 
centralized organization, usually optimizing its benefits, disregarding the individual goals of the 
independent SCs, especially when dealing with decentralized SCs, and thus conflicts may arise.  
Solving these conflicts from a negotiation perspective has been studied through multi-objective 
optimization and Game Theory. For instance, negotiations through “revenue sharing” based on 
Stackelberg game for one manufacturer and many competing retailers [3]; or through developing a bi-
level MINLP design and planning model under the leading role of the manufacturer [4]. Most of the 
negotiation mechanisms through Game Theory at the tactical level focus on the competitiveness among 
the retailers disregarding the supplier’s competitive behavior. Furthermore, the aforementioned 
approaches are based on single leadership, without considering uncertainty reduction costs when the 
negotiating partners arrive to an agreement, leading to insufficient coordination. Price negotiations as a 
way to reach a coordination agreement has been studied in the literature; as a qualitative methodology [5], 
or based on the “timing” between producer and customer, such as waiting to sell or to buy under the 
uncertain buyer’s revenue and seller’s cost [6].   
Accordingly, this work aims to help solving these conflicts by establishing the best conditions for the 
coordination contract through quantitative negotiations built on win-to-win principles by considering the 
aforementioned issues in one single approach. A scenario-based negotiation approach will be developed 
taking into consideration the individual and global profits based on independent and dependent SCs 
optimization at the tactical level. The decisions provided are the raw materials (RM) acquisition, 
intermediate product price/quantity, production, inventory, and distribution levels under the objective 
function of maximizing the profit (individual/global).  
Methods 
Assume that there are two completely independent SCs with their own independent suppliers and markets 
(Figure 1). SC2 as a leader partner decides to improve its benefits by buying internal product/s from SC1 
(follower); the negotiation item is thus the product's supply/demand. A scenario-based negotiation 
approach is developed; the methodological framework (Figure 1) consists on analyzing different price 
scenarios for the negotiation item offered by the leader SC: The negotiation procedure is divided into two 
main steps: 1) Negotiation scenarios, and 2) Coordination agreement. The first step aims to find out the 
best negotiation scenario to be used for the second step.  
    
Figure 1- Negotiation methodology 
1) Negotiation scenarios:  
Pre-Negotiation Scenario: Both negotiating partners optimize their SCs profits separately, without 
considering the internal products (without coordination).   
Negotiation Scenario I) “Individual objectives-based negotiation”:  
- The leader offers the follower SC a set of contract prices for the negotiation item (internal product) 
ensuing from maximizing its SC profit, resulting in a set of internal product quantities each planning 
time period. 
- Based on these quantities and prices, the follower maximizes its SC profit. 
- A set of total Profits are obtained (SC1 profit + SC2 profit).  
Negotiation Scenario II) “Global objective-based negotiation”: For each price and quantity scenarios, 
both negotiating partners are united in one global model to maximize the global SC profit, resulting in a 
complex objective function (SC1 profit & SC2 profit).   
After analyzing the three scenarios, the most profitable (with the highest total profit) is considered for 
preparing the coordination agreement (step 2).  
2) Coordination agreement 
After selecting the most adequate negotiation scenario, the leader SC expects a set of apparent prices and 
the corresponding expected profits,     
- The cost of reduction of uncertainty is considered, which is modeled as a probability of acceptance. The 
probability of acceptance is calculated as the risk associated with the uncertain behavior of the external 
conditions of the follower SC, as a way to push the negotiation towards win-to-win policy. To do so, 
and for each contract price offer, a set of external risk scenarios (follower SC) are generated using 
Monte-Carlo method assuming normal distribution, resulting in a set of probability distribution curves.  
- The leader SC then calculates its apparent prices in function of the probability of acceptance each 
scenario; the leader SC model is then optimized for each apparent price, resulting in a set of expected 
profits. The apparent price that leads to the most profitable expected profit is settled for the coordination 
agreement from the leader side.  
- The follower then evaluates its SC profit based on the contract price selected by the leader using the 
corresponding probability distribution curve of the offered contract price.  
To apply these negotiation scenarios in a systematic way, a generic mathematical model is developed. 
Mathematical model: 
A generic MINLP tactical model is developed as a basis for all negotiation scenarios. A set of supply 
chains (sc1, sc2… SC) is developed with their new subsets linking each SC to its corresponding 
negotiation partner (follower F or leader L). The total external demand
,r txdem represents the typical 
markets' fulfillment of resource r  from any echelon as stated by Eq. (1), where M represents the external 
markets.  
, , , , ,r sc t r sc m tprod xdem                                                                ; ; ;r R m M sc SC t T            (1) 
Eq. (2) represents the negotiation part between the leader and the follower SCs through the internal 
market demand
, ,r sc tidem   of the negotiation item r , which must be equal to the production levels of r in 
the follower SC (F). 
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The total sales can be calculated by multiplying the price of the final/internal product by the quantity 
demanded by the external markets M and/or the leader SC (Eq. 3). Where ,r tpr   represents the price of the 
negotiation item r  
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The SC total cost along the considered planning horizon T (RM purchase, transport, storage, and 
production total costs, respectively) (Eq. 4) 
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The objective function corresponds to the maximization of the SC profit (Eq. 5), which is calculated as 
the difference between the total sales and the total costs. The “abridged” uncertainty risk is considered as 
an uncertainty reduction cost, to be represented with the probability of acceptance scACprob   (Eq. 6).  
–sc sc scPROF SALES COST   uncertainty risk                                                                    sc SC          (5) 
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The apparent price , ,r sc tApr   is calculated based on the probability of acceptance and the alternative 
supplier price , ,r sc txpr  (Eq. 7) 
, , , , , ,. .(1 )r sc t r sc t sc r sc t scApr pr ACprob xpr ACprob           ; ; ; ;r R r R r r sc L t T                    (7) 
Application of the negotiation scenarios: 
Pre-Negotiation scenario: the internal market demand 
, ,r sc tidem    and the uncertainty risk will be equal to 
zero, and therefore, the calculations will end at Eq. (5). 
Negotiation Scenario I): in this case, Eq. (2) will be substituted by Eq. (8); the internal market demand 
, ,r sc tidem   will be equal to a constant value , ,r sc tE   each price , ,r sc tpr    scenario resulted from maximizing 
the profit of the leader SC, 
, , , ,r sc t r sc tidem E                                                                                    ; ;r R sc L t T                   (8) 
Negotiation Scenario II): where the internal market demand 
, ,r sc tidem   will be considered as in Eq. (2), 
and global SC profit model will be optimized for the objective function (Tprofit ) Eq. (9),  
sc
sc SC
Tprofit PROF

                                                                                                                                (9) 
Case Study:  
The proposed approach has been implemented and solved for a case study modified from [7] by 
decentralizing the entire SC according to the negotiation approach (Figure 2). The negotiating partners are 
the polystyrene production/distribution SC (as leader), and the Energy generation SC (as follower), while 
the internal energy represents the negotiation item. One RM supplier of 4 competing biomass suppliers 
feed 6 energy plants. Four RM competing suppliers provide 3 polystyrene production plants with 4 
alternative resources in order to produce two polystyrene products. The final products are stored in 2 DCs 
and later distributed to the final polystyrene markets. The case study is modelled using the General 
Algebraic Modeling System GAMS 24.2.3, and the resulting MINLP tactical models have been solved 
for 6 time periods; 1000 working hours each, using Global mixed-integer quadratic optimizer 
(GloMIQO). To obtain the probability of acceptance of the Energy SC, and the probability distribution 
curves, the model has been solved, each price scenario, for 500 generated scenarios using Monte-Carlo 
method (assuming normal distribution).  
 
Figure 2- Negotiating SCs partners 
Results and discussion 
The individual and global profits based on the negotiation scenarios were obtained. Figure 3 shows the 
resulting total profits vs the negotiation item (internal energy) contract price. The violet line represents 
the total profit ensuing from the pre-negotiation scenario. The negotiation starts when total profits exceed 
this line, otherwise, coordination is not necessary. It is noticed that the individual objectives-based 
negotiation scenario (I) proves to be a better negotiation approach than scenario (II), as it leads to higher 
total profits in most of the contract price scenarios, with the highest amount of 17.49 M€ at the contract 
price 0.18 €/kWh, with a difference of 8.6% and 3.5% comparing with the pre-negotiation and scenario 
(II). Furthermore, the model statistics shows that scenario (I) provides solutions in less computational 
times (CPU 11.8 sec) compared with 15.6 sec and 31.6 sec needed for the pre-negotiation and scenario 
(II) approaches.  
 
Figure 3- Negotiation scenarios total profits 
To analyze the negotiation scenario (I) (before the agreement), Figure 4 shows the economic decisions 
arising from the negotiating contract prices. Figure 4a represents the energy SC Costs and the breakdown 
of the total sales. It is worth noticing that the highest energy SC profit corresponds to the contract price 
(0.21 €/kWh) with 3.25 M€, while the polystyrene SC profit reaches the lowest (7.53 M€) before 
returning to their pre-negotiation status (Energy SC profit: 2.44M€; Polystyrene SC profit: 7.44 M€) at 
prices scenarios (0.23-0.25€/kWh), as the polystyrene SC prefers to purchase energy from the local Grid 
at lower prices (0.2 - 0.22 €/kWh). Here, it can be noticed the competitiveness role in the negotiations, 
leading to exclude the contract price scenarios (0.23-0.25 €/kWh) from the next negotiation step 
(coordination agreement). 
  
Figure 4- Scenario I analysis- economic decisions profile  
a) Energy SC  b) Polystyrene SC 
The probability of acceptance is calculated each contract energy price, based on 500 generated risk 
scenarios for the external energy prices of the Energy SC, assuming normal distribution. Figure 5 shows 
the contract and expected Polystyrene SC profit vs the probability of acceptance. It can be noticed that the 
highest expected Polystyrene SC profit (7.88M€) is at contract price (0.15 €/kWh) (Table 1), which is 
14% less than the contract Polystyrene profit (8.98M€) at the same contract price. It is expected that the 
probability of acceptance curve increases as the contract price increases; but at contract price (0.22 
€/kWh), the polystyrene SC decides to buy higher amounts of energy from the local Grid network (Table 
1), resulting in the sudden decrease of the probability of acceptance (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5- Polystyrene SC contract/expected Profit vs. Probability of acceptance 
Table 1 summarizes the expected Polystyrene SC decisions: the total energy amounts needed for the 
Polystyrene SC is (24.71GWh); at the contract price 0.15€/kWh, it is expected that 36% “probability of 
acceptance (Figure 5)” of this amount will be supplied from the energy SC (8.84 GWh), while the rest is 
to be supplied from the local Grid network (15.86GWh). This explains why the expected Polystyrene SC 
profit at 0.15€/kWh is higher than at contract price 0.14€/kWh, as the probability of acceptance increases.   
Table 1- Polystyrene SC contract prices scenarios and expected decisions 
Internal energy  
contract price 
(€/kWh) 
Apparent 
energy price 
(€/kWh) 
Expected 
poystyrene 
Profit (M€) 
Expected internal energy  Expected energy from Grid  
(GWh) (M€) (GWh) (M€) 
0.14 0.196 7.86 7.36 1.44 17.34 3.64 
0.15 0.195 7.88 8.84 1.72 15.86 3.33 
0.16 0.197 7.84 9.29 1.83 15.42 3.24 
0.17 0.200 7.77 10.13 2.02 14.58 3.06 
0.18 0.201 7.74 11.51 2.32 13.19 2.77 
0.19 0.205 7.64 12.75 2.61 11.96 2.51 
0.20 0.209 7.56 13.98 2.92 10.72 2.25 
0.21 0.214 7.49 15.47 3.31 9.24 1.94 
0.22 0.215 7.49 11.56 2.48 13.14 2.76 
From the Energy SC side, and based on the contract offer of the polystyrene SC (8.84GWh at contract 
price 0.15 €/kWh), the resulting Energy SC profit (2.56M€) improves the pre-negotiation Profit by 5%.  
According to the probability distribution curve (Figure 6), the resulting Energy profit seems to have a 
high probability of occurrence, in which the Energy SC should accept.  
 
Figure 6- Probability Distribution of the Energy SC Profit 
Conclusions 
A win-to-win Scenario-Based negotiation approach is proposed for a decentralized multi-site multi-
product SC in a highly competitive environment. Under the leading role of one partner SC, different price 
scenarios are analyzed: i) pre-negotiation scenario, ii) individual objectives-based negotiation (scenario I), 
and iii) global objective-based negotiation scenario (scenario II), resulting in different MINLP models, 
which have been used to determine the decisions needed, which maximize the individual/global SCs 
profits, to fulfill different external requirements. The proposed approach is illustrated using a case study 
which coordinates different suppliers’ SCs (follower) and an industrial production/distribution SC 
(leader) through a global scenario. A reduction cost of uncertainty is considered when estimating the 
expected leader SC profit in form of probability of acceptance. The results show that the negotiation 
scenario (I) based on maximizing individual objectives proves to be the most adequate scenario leading to 
higher global profits of 8.6% and 3.5% than the pre-negotiation and negotiation scenario II, respectively. 
The expected leader SC profit is obtained, and the follower SC profit is evaluated using its probability 
distribution curves. The proposed approach allows to contemplate the different mechanisms a SC may use 
to modify its relationships with its customers and suppliers during the optimization procedure, which can 
be used for further second stage agreements.   
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